From d1c9e14bf08c60a7109f5bb3ef3c09a09f9c617d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: saopig1 <4x7sw862st@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 27 May 2026 13:38:35 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] feat(auth): add csrfOriginCheck middleware

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---
 src/web/middleware/csrf.test.ts | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 src/web/middleware/csrf.ts      | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 93 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 src/web/middleware/csrf.test.ts
 create mode 100644 src/web/middleware/csrf.ts

diff --git a/src/web/middleware/csrf.test.ts b/src/web/middleware/csrf.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d056ebd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/web/middleware/csrf.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach } from "vitest";
+import express from "express";
+import request from "supertest";
+import { csrfOriginCheck } from "./csrf.js";
+
+describe("csrfOriginCheck middleware", () => {
+  let app: express.Express;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    app = express();
+    app.use(csrfOriginCheck);
+    app.get("/", (_req, res) => res.json({ ok: true }));
+    app.post("/", (_req, res) => res.json({ ok: true }));
+  });
+
+  it("allows safe methods (GET/HEAD/OPTIONS) without Origin", async () => {
+    const res = await request(app).get("/");
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects POST without Origin or Referer", async () => {
+    const res = await request(app).post("/");
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(res.body).toEqual({ error: "bad origin" });
+  });
+
+  it("accepts POST when Origin host matches request host", async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .post("/")
+      .set("Host", "example.com")
+      .set("Origin", "https://example.com");
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects POST when Origin host does not match request host", async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .post("/")
+      .set("Host", "example.com")
+      .set("Origin", "https://evil.com");
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  it("accepts POST when Referer host matches and Origin is absent", async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .post("/")
+      .set("Host", "example.com")
+      .set("Referer", "https://example.com/some/path");
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects POST when Referer host does not match", async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .post("/")
+      .set("Host", "example.com")
+      .set("Referer", "https://evil.com/some/path");
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+});
diff --git a/src/web/middleware/csrf.ts b/src/web/middleware/csrf.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9907eab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/web/middleware/csrf.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+import type { Request, Response, NextFunction } from "express";
+
+const SAFE_METHODS = new Set(["GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"]);
+
+/**
+ * Same-origin CSRF protection. For mutating requests, the Origin or Referer
+ * header must indicate a host equal to the request's own host.
+ *
+ * SameSite=Lax on the session cookie blocks classic cross-site form posts;
+ * this header check covers the remaining attack surface.
+ */
+export function csrfOriginCheck(req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction): void {
+  if (SAFE_METHODS.has(req.method)) {
+    next();
+    return;
+  }
+  const expectedHost = req.get("host");
+  const originHeader = req.get("origin");
+  const refererHeader = req.get("referer");
+  const headerHost = hostOf(originHeader) ?? hostOf(refererHeader);
+  if (!headerHost || !expectedHost || headerHost !== expectedHost) {
+    res.status(403).json({ error: "bad origin" });
+    return;
+  }
+  next();
+}
+
+function hostOf(url: string | undefined): string | null {
+  if (!url) return null;
+  try {
+    return new URL(url).host;
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}